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RECENT DECISIONS
CONTRACTS-VENDOR-PURCHASER-BREACH BY ANTICIPATORY
REPUDIATION.--Under a contract for the sale of land, situated in
Nebraska, the purchase price was to be $45,000, payable $2,000 on
contract, $43,000 on delivery of title and possession. Two weeks
prior to the closing date the vendee unequivocally declared that when
the time for performance arrived he would not perform. The day
fixed for closing title came and passed with no offer to perform by
either party. Three weeks thereafter, the vendee stated that he had
reconsidered and offered to tender the full purchase price. The
vendor refused to perform and began this action, alleging prior rescis-
sion of the contract, to clear the cloud on his title. The defendant
counterclaimed for specific performance. Held, judgment for the
defendant affirmed. A mere statement by a party to an executory
contract made prior to the date of performance, to the effect that he
cannot and will not perform on the law day or thereafter, does not
constitute an abandonment of his right acquired by that contract.
The doctrine of anticipatory repudiation does not inure to the benefit
of the other contracting party in the absence of an affirmative act of
termination made by such party in reliance upon the repudiation.
Lang v. Todd, - Neb. -, 28 N. W. 2d 434 (1947).
It is well established law in those jurisdictions that follow the
doctrine of Frost v. Knight 1 and other English cases,2 that in execu-
tory bilateral contracts any voluntary affirmative act which renders
substantial performance impossible gives to the injured party a right
to immediately bring an action to secure the losses he may sustain
by the wrongdoer's breach 3 of contract; 4 however, withdrawal by
See People v. Ephraim, 77 Cal. App. 29, 245 Pac. 769, 774 (1926) ; Flynn v.
State, 10 Okla. Cr. 41, 133 Pac. 1133 (1913).
1L. R. 7 Ex. 111, 112 (1872). Cockburn, C.J., "The promisee, if he
pleases, may treat the notice of intention as inoperative, and await the time
when the contract is to be executed, and then hold the other party responsible
for all the consequences of non-performance; but in that case he keeps the
contract alive for the benefit of the other party as well as his own; he remains
subject to all his obligations and liabilities under it, and enables the other
party not only to complete the contract, if so advised, notwithstanding his
previous repudiation of it, but also to take advantage of any supervening
circumstances which would justify him in declining to complete it." Another
leading case on this subject is Hockster v. De La Tour, 2 El. & BI. 67B, 118
Eng. Rep. 922 (K. B. 1853). This concept of law appeared much earlier in
the Codified Civil Law of France. Code Napoleon § 1184 (March 5, 1803).
2 Braithwaite v. Foreign- Hardwood Co., [1905] 2 K. B. 543; British &
Bennington, Ltd. v. Northwestern Cachar Tea Co., Ltd., [1923] A. C. 48.3 The expression anticipatory breach is elliptical; for there can be no
breach until there is an election to treat the repudiation as a breach, a more
correct term would be "Breach by Anticipatory Repudiation." See, Lord
Wrenbury, in Bradley v. Newsom Sons & Co., [1919] A.-C. 16, 53; RESTATE:-
MENT, CONTRACTS § 319 (1932).4 The theory of the action is based on one of the necessary implied terms
in every contract, that each party has the right to the maintenance of the con-
tractual relations up to the time for performance as well as the performance
of the contract when due. Roehm v. Horst, 178 U. S. 1, 44 L. ed. 953 (1899).
PouND, OUTLINE OF A CoURSE IN THE HISTORY AND SYSTEM OF THE COMMON
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the repudiator, before an action has been brought, or before some
change of position on the part of the aggrieved party in reliance upon
the repudiation, nullifies all effects of the repudiation.5 "An an-
nouncement of an intention to break the contract is no more than
an offer to rescind." 6 Under this notion, it is not the word of the
repudiator that brings the contract to an end, but the election of the
other party to treat it as a termination.7
The hostility to the acceptance of this doctrine of breach by
anticipatory repudiation has been so great, that the doctrine has been
applied with constant hesitation and caution. Not only do various
jurisdictions reach wholly divergent results, but frequently, even the
decisions in the same jurisdiction are difficult, if not impossible to
reconcile. In New York the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation
seems to be limited to contracts to marry,8 for personal services,9 and
for the manufacture or sale of goods; 10 but does not apply to uni-
lateral contracts where the only contractual duty to be performed
is the payment of money at a future time; "1 or to policies of
LAw 44, Jural Postulate III (1927). But see Vold, The Tort Aspect of
Anticipatory Repudiation of Contracts, 41 HARV. L. REv. 340 (1928).
5 United Press Ass'n v. National Newspaper Ass'n, 237 Fed. 546 (C. C. A.
8th 1916) ; 13 C. J. § 732 (1917).6 Hockster v. De La Tour, 2 El. & BI. 678, 683, 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (K. B.
1853).
7 Under the rule laid down in these English cases, a failure to treat antici-
patory repudiation as a breach would involve a continuance of the obligations
of the contract upon both sides. Thus, the promisee, if this were literally
true, could enhance the defendant's damages by a continuation of the con-
tractual obligation, but under the great weight of American and English au-
thority, if the plaintiff elects to wait until the stated time for performance,
he will be excused from performance or being ready to perform, but he has
no right to continue to perform, if by so doing, damages of the defendant will
be enhanced. See WIsmsroN, SALEs § 589 (2d ed. 1924).8 Burtis v. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246 (1870). Since the abolition of actions
for breach of promise in N. Y. (N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr-§ 61a-i) this class of
cases had disappeared.
9 Howard v. Daly, 61 N. Y. 362 (1875).
10 Nichols v. S. S. Co., 137 N. Y. 471, 33 N. E. 561 (1893); Windmuller
v. Pope, 107 N. Y. 674, 14 N. E. 436 (1887). In Kelly v. Security Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 78 N. E. 584 (1906) the dicta of the court indi-
cated that the doctrine would be confined to those above mentioned three classes
of contracts. But see Brakarsh v. Brown, 162 Misc. 412, 294 N. Y. Supp. 848
(Sup. Ct. 1937), where the court intimated that an action for anticipatory
breach of a land contract might have been maintained if the plaintiff had
pleaded properly. See also Matter of Vaughan, 156 Misc. 577, 282 N. Y. Supp.
214 (Surr. Ct. 1935), aff'd without opinion, 248 App. Div. 730, 289 N. Y. Supp.
825 (2d Dep't 1935).11 Indian River Corp. v. Manufacturer's Trust, 253 App. Div. 549, 2 N. Y.
S. 2d 860 (1st Dep't 1938), where the court held that the doctrine of antici-
patory repudiation does not apply to contracts for the payment of money only,
installments or otherwise. See also Werner v. Werner, 169 App. Div. 9, 154
N. Y. Supp. 570 (1st Dep't 1915), "... that the doctrine of anticipatory breach
does not apply to a contract to pay money at a future date." The exclusion
of these type cases from the doctrine is purely arbitrary and without reason.
As was said by Learned Hand, J., in Equitable Trust Co. v. Western Pacific
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insurance. 2
Until the present action, Nebraska had rejected the doctrine in
its entirety,13 holding that, "A mere declaration by a party to a con-
tract that he does not intend to carry out the terms thereof before
performance is due will not constitute a breach, so as to authorize
the other to at once maintain an action, . ".. ,, 14
In the instant case, the seller on receiving the vendee's notifi-
cation that he would not perform, had a right to immediately rescind
the contract; but in order for that right to ripen into a rescission, he
had the affirmative duty to notify the defendant that he had elected
to treat the repudiation as a breach and 'no longer considered himself
bound by the contract.15 The only significance of the vendee's con-
duct is that it excused a tender of performance on the law day by
the vendor.18 Therefore, the contract was still in existence and it is
the law in most jurisdictions that where a contract is made for the
sale of real property and the time for closing the transaction is not
expressly made of the essence of the contract, and where it does not
appear fronii the contract itself that a short delay would essentially
affect the carrying out of the intentions of the parties, a court of
equity may compel specific performance although the party asking
Ry. Co., 244 Fed. 485, 501 (S. D. N. Y. 1917), aff'd, 250 Fed. 327 (C. C. A.
2d 1918), ". . . the eventual victory of the doctrine over vigorous attack has
not left it scathless .... If the doctrine has any limits, they only exclude,
and that arbitrarily enough, cases in which at once the promisee has wholly
performed, and the promise is only to pay money." But see 5 WnLsTSON,
CONTRAcTS § 1328 (rev. ed. 1937).
12 Kelly v. Security Mutual Life Ins. Co., 186 N. Y. 16, 78 N. E. 584
(1906); see also Langan v. Supreme Council Am. L. of H., 174 N. Y. 266,
66 N. E. 932 (1903). New Jersey and Wisconsin are two states that allow
actions for anticipatory repudiation of insurance contracts. O'Neil v. Supreme
Council Am. L. of H., 70 N. J. L. 410, 57 Atl. 463 (1904); Merrick v.
Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 124 Wis. 221, 102 N. W. 593 (1905).1 3 Nebraska and Massachusetts being the only two states that have refused
to recognize the doctrine. Carstons v. McDonald, S8 Neb. 853, 57 N. W. 757(1894); King v. Waterman, 55 Neb. 324, 75 N. W. 830 (1898); Daniels v.
Newton, 114 Mass. 530 (1874) ; Tirrell v. Anderson, 244 Mass. 273, 138 N. E.
569 (1923).
24 Carstons v. McDonald, 38 Neb. 853, 855, 57 N. W. 757, 759 (1894).15 In New York it seems that contractual obligations to be performed in
the future cannot be shattered by word. There must be something more, the
defendant's words of repudiation must be insistent enough to induce the other,
not only to "accept" the breach, but to "act" by changing his position, until
then the repudiator may still nullify his action. Gray v. Green, 9 Hun 334(N. Y. 1876); Bernstein v. Meech, 130 N. Y. 354, 29 N. E. 255 (1891);
Windmuller v. Pope, 107 N. Y. 674, 14 N. E. 436 (1887). In most other
states, the words themselves are enough to enable the injured party to declare
a breach. See Corduan v. McCloud, 87 N. J. L. 143, 93 At. 724 (1915);
Ault v. Dustin, 100 Tenn. 366, 45 S. W. 981 (1898).
16 "Even though a party who has renounced his contract changes his mind
and desires to carry it out, if he fails to withdraw his renunciation before the
time comes for performance, it will excuse the default of the other party."
Cermak v. Smolik, 112 Neb. 54, 57, 198 N. W. 562, 564 (1924). 5 WiELisToN,
CoNTRAcrs § 1319 (rev. ed. 1937).
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therefore has failed to perform his part by the exact time specified
therein.17
While there is much confusion in the theoretical discussion of
anticipatory breach, and the facts in the instant case may be capable
of another interpretation, the holding in the case is merely a reitera-
tion of the law as Bowen, L.J., first expressed it in Johnstone v.
Milling.18 "It would seem on principle that the declaration of such
inten ion by the promisor 'is not in itself and unless acted on by the
promisee a breach of contract; and that it only becomes a breach when
it is converted by force of what follows it into a.wrongful renuncia-
tion of the contract. Its real operation appears to be to give the
promisee the right of electing either to treat the declaration as brutum
fulmen, and holding fast to the contract to wait till the time for its
performance has arrived, or to act upon it, and treat it as a final
assertion by the promisor that he is no longer bound by the contract
and a wrongful renunciation of the contractual relation into which
he has entered. But such declaration only becomes a wrongful act
if the promisee elects to treat it as such. If he does so elect, it be-
comes a breach of contract and he can recover upon it as such." 1 9
This is the rule that is followed in all states that accept the doctrine,
and no authority, judicial or extra-judicial, has seriously questioned
its substance.
P. T. O'M.
DoMEsTIc RELATIONS-DIVORCE-INJUNCTION-FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT-COMITY.-The plaintiff, a resident of New York,
brings an action for separation against her husband. Her suit is
predicated upon the grounds of cruel and inhuman treatment and
abandonment. Due to the fact that the defendant husband had in-
stituted an action for divorce in France shortly before the commence-
ment of this action, the plaintiff seeks additional injunctive relief to
restrain the defendant from proceeding with his foreign action. The
defendant appeared generally. The trial court denied the plaintiff's
request for the injunction. The plaintiff appealed. Held, there is no
need for the injunction as the court here is not concerned with the
effect of the divorce decree of sister-state, but that of a foreign nation;
therefore the validity of the decree would be governed by principles
of comity rather than by the full faith and credit clause of the Fed-
eral Constitution. Gaskell v. Gaskell, 189 Misc. 504, 72 N. Y. S. 2d
440 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
The plaintiff's application was apparently based upon an exten-
sion of the doctrine of full faith and credit. In order to better under-
17 Po moy'S EQuirY JURISPRUDENCE § 1408 (5th ed. 1941).
28 Johnstone v. Milling, 16 Q. B. D. 460 (1886).
21 Id. at 472, 473.
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